Value of information in competitive economies with incomplete markets by Gottardi, Piero & Rahi, Rohit
 
 
ISSN 0956-8549-596 
 
 
 
 
Value of Information in 
Competitive Economies with 
Incomplete Markets 
 
By 
Piero Gottardi 
Rohit Rahi 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO 596 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
September 2007 
 
 
 
 
Piero Gottardi is a Professor of Economics at the University of Venice since 2000.  He 
holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Cambridge (1991).  Previous 
positions include: Junior Research Officer, Department of Applied Economics, 
University of Cambridge; Prize Research Fellow, Trinity College, Cambridge;  Visiting 
Professor at New York University, Harvard University, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; 
Cowles Foundation, Brown University, Humboldt Universitat, IMPA, NHH; Universitat 
Autonoma Barcelona, Universidad Carlos III, Universidad Alicante.  He is currently a 
member of IAS Princeton (2007-8), a Reserach Fellow at CESIfo and also an Associate 
Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory (1996 - present) and the Journal of Public 
Economic Theory (1999 - present).  Rohit Rahi obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from 
Stanford University in 1993. He is a Reader in Finance and Economics and a member of 
the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics. His research interests 
are in the theory of financial markets, in particular arbitrage in segmented markets, 
security design, and asset pricing with asymmetric information; and in general 
equilibrium theory with incomplete markets. He has published articles in the Review of 
Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and Journal of Business. He served a 
nine-year term on the editorial board of the Review of Economic Studies.  Any opinions 
expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the FMG. The 
research findings reported in this paper are the result of the independent research of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the LSE. 
Value of Information in
Competitive Economies with
Incomplete Markets
by
Piero Gottardi∗
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche
Universita` di Venezia
Fondamenta San Giobbe
Cannaregio, 873
30121 Venezia, Italy
gottardi@unive.it
http://helios.unive.it/∼gottardi/
and
Rohit Rahi
Department of Finance
Department of Economics
and Financial Markets Group
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
r.rahi@lse.ac.uk
http://vishnu.lse.ac.uk/
September 25, 2007.
∗We would like to thank Alex Citanna, Antonio Villanacci, and especially Atsushi Kajii and
Tito Pietra, for helpful comments. The paper has also benefited from the suggestions of the editor,
Andy Postlewaite, and two referees.
Abstract
A substantial literature addresses the negative effect on welfare of the release
of information in a competitive market economy. We show that the value of
information in this setting is typically positive if asset markets are sufficiently
incomplete. More specifically, for any competitive equilibrium of a generic
economy, we can find a finer information structure such that an allocation
that is resource feasible and measurable with respect to this information ex-
post Pareto dominates the given equilibrium allocation.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D60, D80.
Keywords: Competitive Equilibrium, Incomplete Markets, Value of Informa-
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze the value of information in the setup of a
competitive economy under uncertainty in which agents trade in asset markets to
reallocate risk. It is well known that while information always has positive value in
a single-agent decision-making context, this is not necessarily the case in a market
setting. Indeed, if the true state of the world is revealed before markets open, no
mutually beneficial risk sharing trade is possible. Thus at a competitive equilibrium
all agents are worse off, when their welfare is evaluated ex-ante (i.e. prior to the
receipt of any signal). More generally, if markets are complete, information cannot
have positive value in the sense that no signal, whether fully or partly informative,
can lead to an improvement in ex-ante welfare.
The negative effect on welfare of an increase in publicly available information has
come to be known as the Hirshleifer effect, after Hirshleifer (1971) who produced
an early example of it. The Hirshleifer effect can be understood as follows. In the
absence of a signal, agents face a single budget constraint. On the other hand, if
trade occurs after the receipt of a signal, agents must satisfy a budget constraint
for each realization of the signal, which restricts transfers of income across states for
different values of the signal (see Gottardi and Rahi (2001)).
If markets are incomplete, a second welfare effect arises. With additional informa-
tion agents can achieve a larger set of state-contingent payoffs by conditioning their
portfolios on this information. We refer to this as the Blackwell effect, after Blackwell
(1951) who compared the value of different information structures in single-agent de-
cision problems. Roughly speaking, we can think of the value of information in a
competitive market economy as having a negative component due to the Hirshleifer
effect, and a positive component due to the Blackwell effect. The Hirshleifer effect
is stronger the greater is the degree of market completeness. The Blackwell effect,
on the other hand, is stronger the more incomplete markets are, and is absent when
markets are complete.
There is an extensive literature on the value of information in a competitive pure
exchange setting. A long line of papers has followed Hirshleifer’s lead in comparing
competitive equilibrium allocations associated with differing levels of information
(see, for example, Green (1981), Hakansson et al. (1982), Milne and Shefrin (1987),
and Schlee (2001)).1 These papers either derive conditions under which better infor-
mation leads to an ex-ante Pareto inferior allocation or construct special examples
in which information has positive value.
In this paper we provide general conditions under which the value of information
is positive. We depart from the literature cited above in that we compare agents’
welfare at a competitive equilibrium allocation with their welfare at a feasible (not
necessarily equilibrium) allocation that is measurable with respect to a public signal.
Also in contrast to the literature, we evaluate welfare not ex-ante, but ex-post, i.e.
conditionally on each realization of the signal. This captures the Hirshleifer effect in
1Eckwert and Zilcha (2001, 2003) extend this analysis to a class of production economies.
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that utility transfers across different signal realizations are entirely precluded when
we consider a welfare improvement ex-post.2 Such a welfare improvement can then
be attributed to the Blackwell effect dominating the Hirshleifer effect.
More precisely, we consider a class of two-period exchange economies parametrized
by endowments, where agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and given,
symmetric information over the realization of the uncertainty. We show that, pro-
vided markets are sufficiently incomplete, for an arbitrary competitive equilibrium of
a generic economy, there is a finer information structure such that a feasible alloca-
tion measurable with respect to this information structure ex-post Pareto dominates
the given equilibrium allocation. In particular, we demonstrate that an ex-post
Pareto improvement can generically be attained with an arbitrarily small increase in
information.
Our welfare analysis is in the spirit of the literature on constrained inefficiency
where welfare comparisons are made between competitive equilibrium allocations
and allocations attainable subject to appropriately specified constraints (see, for
example, Diamond (1967) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) for some early studies
in this vein). Generic inefficiency results have been obtained for incomplete market
economies by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Citanna et al. (1998)),
among others. Our paper is the first to establish such a result with respect to changes
in public information. Moreover, the proof poses some new technical difficulties.
These arise primarily because first order welfare effects are zero, for reasons that we
explain later. Hence we need to consider second order effects in order to show that
a welfare improvement can be found.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. The welfare
notion is presented in Section 3; the main inefficiency result is then stated and proved.
The proofs of some instrumental Lemmas are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Economy
There are two periods, 0 and 1, and a single physical consumption good. The econ-
omy is populated by H ≥ 2 agents, with typical agent h ∈ H (here, and elsewhere,
we use the same symbol for a set and its cardinality). No consumption takes place at
date 0 and agents have no endowment in that period. Uncertainty, which is resolved
at date 1, is described by S states of the world. The probability of state s ∈ S is
denoted by pis.
Agent h ∈ H has an endowment at date 1 given by ωh ∈ RS++, and preferences
over date 1 consumption described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
uh : R++ → R, which is assumed to satisfy the following standard conditions:
2In this regard, we should also mention Campbell (2004), who shows that with complete markets
any increase of information in the sense of Blackwell (1951) has a negative effect on agents’ welfare.
The result is obtained by comparing welfare at allocations associated with different information
structures when these allocations have to be feasible and, in addition, satisfy ex-post individual
rationality constraints.
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Assumption 1
(i) uh is C2.
(ii) uh
′
> 0 and uh
′′
< 0.
(iii) limc→0 uh
′
[c] =∞.
Asset markets, in which J ≥ 2 securities are traded, open at date 0. At date 1
assets pay off, and agents consume. Asset payoffs in state s are denoted by rs ∈ RJ .
Thus a portfolio y ∈ RJ yields a payoff rs · y in state s. Let R be the S × J matrix
whose s’th row is r>s (by default all vectors are column vectors, unless transposed).
We impose the following, fairly standard, regularity conditions on the payoff matrix
R:
Assumption 2
(i) There is an asset, say asset J , whose payoff is nonnegative in every state and
positive in at least one state.
(ii) R is in general position, i.e. every J × J submatrix of R is nonsingular.
Property (i), together with the monotonicity assumption on utility functions, ensures
that the equilibrium price of asset J is positive. It also guarantees that budget
constraints are satisfied with equality. Property (ii) requires that asset payoffs vary
sufficiently across states.
Asset prices are given by a vector p ∈ RJ . By Assumption 2, we can choose
asset J as the numeraire, i.e. set pJ = 1. Let y
h ∈ RJ denote the portfolio of agent
h. Since portfolios uniquely determine consumption (the consumption of agent h in
state s is given by ωhs + rs · yh), an allocation is completely specified by a collection
of portfolios, one for each agent h ∈ H.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of an allocation {yh}h∈H , and a
price vector p, satisfying the following two conditions:
(a) Agent optimization: ∀h ∈ H, yh solves
maxy
∑
s pis u
h[ωhs + rs · y]
subject to p · y = 0.
(1)
(b) Market clearing: ∑
h
yh = 0. (2)
We consider a set of economies parametrized by the agents’ endowments ω :=
{ωh}h∈H ∈ RSH++. The space of economies is then RSH++ and by “generically” we mean
“for an open, dense subset of RSH++.”
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3 Blackwell Inefficiency
At any competitive equilibrium the information of agents over the realization of the
uncertainty is given by the probability distribution over S, {pis}s∈S. We intend to
investigate whether an increase in the information available to agents can be found
such that a feasible allocation consistent with this information structure Pareto dom-
inates a given equilibrium allocation. Taking {pis}s∈S as the prior over S, we model
an increase in information about the realization of s by a public signal correlated
with s. As is well-known for economies in which allocations depend on such a signal,
various efficiency criteria can be defined depending on the stage at which utilities are
evaluated (see Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983)). As mentioned in the Introduction,
the literature on the value of information in a market economy adopts the ex-ante
efficiency criterion, where agents’ welfare is evaluated unconditionally, before the re-
ceipt of any signal. In contrast, we use the notion of ex-post efficiency, where agents’
welfare is evaluated conditionally on the realization of the signal.
We show that, for any competitive equilibrium of a generic economy, an appro-
priate public signal and a corresponding feasible portfolio allocation can be found in
such a way as to make everyone better off ex-post (and hence also ex-ante). In other
words, as described in the Introduction, it is generically possible to find an increase
in agents’ information such that the Blackwell effect dominates the Hirshleifer ef-
fect. We refer to this informational inefficiency property of competitive equilibria as
Blackwell inefficiency.
We now formally describe the set of signals we consider, and the corresponding
feasible allocations. Since our objective is to demonstrate the existence of a signal
with an associated Pareto improvement, there is no loss of generality in imposing
any restriction on the set of signals that is convenient for our analysis. Accordingly
we assume that all signals have the same support Σ, with a generic element of Σ
denoted by σ. Furthermore, we assume that the cardinality of Σ, also denoted by
Σ, is at least 3, and that the marginal distribution of all signals over Σ is uniform.3
To ensure consistency with the probability structure of the underlying state space S,
the marginal distribution over S must also be the same for all signals and equal to
{pis}s∈S. Having fixed the state spaces S and Σ, each signal is completely described
by the probabilities pi := {pisσ}s∈S,σ∈Σ ∈ RSΣ++, where pisσ denotes Prob(s, σ); let
pis|σ := Prob(s|σ) and piσ := Prob(σ). The set of possible signals is thus given by the
set:4
Π :=
{
pi ∈ RSΣ++
∣∣∣ ∑
σ∈Σ
pisσ = pis, ∀s ∈ S;
∑
s∈S
pisσ = piσ, ∀σ ∈ Σ
}
,
where we use the vector pi to identify a signal, and piσ :=
1
Σ
.5 The agents’ infor-
3Since we are interested in evaluating agents’ welfare ex-post, conditional on each σ ∈ Σ, the
marginal distribution over Σ must be the same (though not necessarily uniform) for all signals in
order for the welfare comparison to make sense. See also footnote 6 below.
4Note that the adding-up restriction
∑
s,σ pisσ = 1 follows from the adding-up restriction on pis.
5For convenience we will continue to use the notation piσ in the rest of the paper. The assumption
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mation at any competitive equilibrium is described by the “initial” signal pi ∈ Π,
which is completely uninformative about s, i.e. satisfies the independence condition
pisσ = pispiσ, for all s ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ. Any other signal pi ∈ Π represents a purely in-
formational change relative to pi and an increase in information over pi. Notice that
this construction allows us to examine smooth perturbations of the information of
agents at an equilibrium, or local changes in information, by considering values of pi
in a neighborhood of pi.
Given any signal pi, we can define an associated portfolio allocation as an al-
location that is measurable with respect to the signal:
{
yhσ
}
h∈H ∈ RJH , for each
σ ∈ Σ. We say then that the associated portfolio allocation is feasible if it satisfies,
in addition, the resource feasibility condition:∑
h
yhσ = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (3)
We are now ready to provide a formal definition of our notion of informationally
inefficiency:
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p} is Blackwell inefficient if there
exists a signal pi ∈ Π and a corresponding feasible allocation {yhσ}h∈H,σ∈Σ such that∑
s
pis|σ uh[ωhs + rs · yhσ] ≥
∑
s
pis u
h[ωh + rs · yh], ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ, (4)
where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
We will prove that, generically, competitive equilibria are Blackwell inefficient.
But first we wish to show that the welfare improvement allowed by the increase in
the agents’ information is indeed the consequence of the larger hedging possibili-
ties available to agents. The next Lemma establishes that when asset markets are
complete, so that agents’ hedging possibilities cannot be expanded by an increase
in information, competitive equilibria are always Blackwell efficient. In fact, an im-
provement cannot be found even according to the weaker, ex-ante welfare criterion.
To this end we introduce the following variant of Definition 2:
Definition 3 A competitive equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p} is ex-ante Blackwell inefficient
if there exists a signal pi ∈ Π and a corresponding feasible allocation {yhσ}h∈H,σ∈Σ such
that ∑
s,σ
pisσ u
h[ωhs + rs · yhσ] ≥
∑
s,σ
pisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh], ∀h ∈ H, (5)
where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
that the marginal distribution of the signals over Σ is uniform, i.e. piσ := 1Σ , σ ∈ Σ, is used only
once, in the proof of Lemma A.3 in the Appendix.
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Given the restriction, implied by pi ∈ Π, that piσ = piσ, for all σ ∈ Σ, (4) can be
written as∑
s
pisσ u
h[ωhs + rs · yhσ] ≥
∑
s
pisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh], ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ, (6)
which clearly implies (5). Hence ex-ante Blackwell efficiency implies Blackwell effi-
ciency.6
Lemma 1 Suppose markets are complete. Then a competitive equilibrium is ex-ante
Blackwell efficient.
Note that, since probabilities vary in the welfare comparison considered in the Black-
well efficiency notion, the result is not an immediate consequence of the first welfare
theorem, and requires an additional argument.7
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider a competitive equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p}, and suppose it is ex-ante Blackwell
inefficient. Then there is a pˆi ∈ Π and a feasible allocation {yhσ}h∈H,σ∈Σ such that
condition (5) holds at pi = pˆi, i.e.∑
s,σ
pˆisσ u
h[ωhs + rs · yhσ] ≥
∑
s,σ
pisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh], ∀h ∈ H, (7)
with at least one strict inequality. Since∑
s,σ
pisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh] =
∑
s
pis u
h[ωh + rs · yh]
=
∑
s
pˆis u
h[ωh + rs · yh]
∑
σ
pˆiσ|s
=
∑
s,σ
pˆisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh],
condition (7) can be equivalently written as∑
s,σ
pˆisσ u
h[ωhs + rs · yhσ] ≥
∑
s,σ
pˆisσ u
h[ωh + rs · yh], ∀h ∈ H.
This means that, keeping pi fixed at pˆi, the (random) allocation {yhσ}h∈H,σ∈Σ ex-ante
Pareto dominates {yh}h∈H . However, since by assumption markets are complete,
the competitive equilibrium allocation {yh}h∈H is ex-ante Pareto efficient and this
6This property does not hold in the absence of the invariance property of the marginal distribu-
tion of pi over Σ, which we have employed in order to get (6).
7This result also differs from sunspot ineffectivity results (e.g. Cass and Shell (1983)), since the
public signal σ is typically correlated with the uncertainty over fundamentals described by s and
hence does not constitute sunspot uncertainty.
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property, characterized by the equality of the agents’ marginal rates of substitution
across states,
uh
′
[ωhs + rs · yh]
uh′[ωhsˆ + rsˆ · yh]
=
uhˆ
′
[ωhˆs + rs · yhˆ]
uhˆ
′
[ωhˆsˆ + rsˆ · yhˆ]
, ∀h, hˆ ∈ H; s, sˆ ∈ S,
is independent of the value of pi. Hence, there cannot be an allocation which ex-ante
Pareto dominates {yh}h∈H , for any pi. This is a contradiction. 2
We can now state and prove our main result.
Theorem Suppose S > J + H and J > H + 1. Then, for a generic subset of
economies, every competitive equilibrium is Blackwell inefficient.
The Theorem states that for any equilibrium allocation of a generic economy, there
exists a signal such that a feasible allocation measurable with respect to that signal is
ex-post Pareto improving. The argument in the proof shows that an ex-post Pareto
improvement can in fact be attained, for a generic economy, with an infinitesimal
increase in information. The result requires markets to be sufficiently incomplete.
The proof is based on the following idea. We identify the conditions an allocation
must satisfy to be locally Blackwell efficient. Then we evaluate these conditions at
a competitive equilibrium allocation and show that, generically, they cannot hold.
From this it follows that it is generically possible to achieve a Pareto improvement
by considering a local perturbation of the signal structure away from a completely
uninformative one.
The main difficulty we face in the proof lies in the fact that the first order nec-
essary conditions (FONCs) for Blackwell efficiency are always satisfied at an equi-
librium allocation (for reasons explained in Step 3 of the proof, first order changes
in information and in agents’ portfolios cannot lead to a welfare improvement). We
have then to turn our attention to the second order necessary conditions (SONCs)
and show that they, generically, cannot hold. While FONCs can be employed without
having to establish constraint qualification (as in Citanna et al. (1998), for example),
this is not the case for SONCs. Indeed, for SONCs, there are no usable constraint
qualification conditions other than nondegeneracy of the constraint set, i.e. full rank
of the Jacobian of the constraints (which we establish in Lemma A.3 in the Ap-
pendix).8
Proof of Theorem:
The proof requires that two full rank properties, involving agents’ utilities and
marginal utilities, be satisfied at a competitive equilibrium. These properties are es-
tablished in Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for a generic subset of economies.
8In particular, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions do not suffice. For details see Simon (1986)
or, for a full treatment, Hestenes (1975) or Berkovitz (2002).
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For our analysis below we consider an economy in the intersection of these two generic
subsets, which we denote by Ωˆ. Clearly, Ωˆ is also a generic subset.
The proof is organized in five steps. In Step 1 we write down the system of
equations that a competitive equilibrium must satisfy. In Step 2 we derive the first
and second order necessary conditions for an equilibrium to be Blackwell efficient.
Then, in Step 3, we show that the FONCs are always satisfied at an equilibrium.
Step 4 is devoted to a detailed study of the SONCs, which are shown to imply a key
condition, labeled condition (C). Finally, in Step 5, we show that condition (C) is
never satisfied at an equilibrium of an economy in Ωˆ. Therefore, the SONCs do not
hold, so an equilibrium cannot be Blackwell efficient.
We first introduce some shorthand notation for matrices which will be used in
the proof. Given an index set I with typical element i, and a collection {zi}i∈I
of vectors or matrices, we denote by diagi∈I [zi] the (block) diagonal matrix with
typical entry zi, where i varies across all elements of I. For a given vector or matrix
z, diagi∈I [z] is then the diagonal matrix with the term z repeated #I times. In a
similar fashion, we write [. . . zi . . .i∈I ] to denote the row block with typical element
zi, and analogously for column blocks.
9 We denote by IK the K×K identity matrix,
and let 1>K := (1 1 . . . 1)1×K . We use the same symbol 0 for the zero scalar and the
zero matrix; in the latter case we occasionally indicate the dimension in order to
clarify the argument. A “∗” stands for any term whose value is immaterial to the
analysis.
We will sometimes need to consider states or agents in a particular sequence. For
this purpose we order the set S (and similarly the sets Σ and H) as {s1, s2, . . .}, s1
being the first state and so on.
Step 1: Characterization of equilibria
The first order conditions of the utility-maximization program (1) are:10∑
s
pis u
h′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs − λh p = 0, ∀h ∈ H (8)
p · yh = 0, ∀h ∈ H, (9)
where λh is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. By Wal-
ras’ law, the market-clearing equation for one asset is redundant. Hence, the market-
clearing condition (2) reduces to ∑
h
yˆh = 0, (10)
where yˆh is the vector obtained from yh by deleting the last element.
9We drop reference to the index set if it is obvious from the context: for example diagh∈H is
shortened to diagh, and [. . . zs . . .s 6=s1 ] is shorthand for [. . . zs . . .s∈S,s 6=s1 ].
10Due to Assumption 1, equilibrium consumption is strictly positive in every state.
10
Any competitive equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p}, together with the associated Lagrange
multipliers {λh}h∈H , must satisfy the equation system (8)–(10).
Step 2: Characterization of Blackwell efficiency
Take an arbitrary equilibrium of an economy in the generic set Ωˆ and denote it by
{{yh}h∈H , p}, with corresponding Lagrange multipliers {λh}h∈H . Denote the utility
levels of agent h at the equilibrium allocation {yh}h∈H by uhs := uh[ωh + rs · yh] in
state s, with expected utility uh :=
∑
s pis u
h[ωh + rs · yh]. Analogously, let uhs ′ :=
uh
′
[ωhs + rs · yh], and uhs ′′ := uh′′[ωhs + rs · yh].
Let y := {yhσ}h∈H,σ∈Σ, with y = y meaning that yhσ = yh, for all h, σ, and
ξ := (pi, y) ∈ Π × RJHΣ. If the equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p} is Blackwell efficient, then
ξ := (pi, y) is a solution to the following program:
max
ξ
∑
s
pisσ1
(
uh1 [ωh1s + rs · yh1σ1 ]− uh1
)
(P)
subject to
Φ1 :=
∑
s
pisσ
(
uh[ωhs + rs · yhσ]− uh
)
≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ, (h, σ) 6= (h1, σ1)
Φ2 :=
∑
h
yhσ = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ
Φ3 :=
∑
σ
pisσ − pis = 0, ∀s ∈ S
Φ4 :=
∑
s
pisσ − piσ = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ, σ 6= σ1
where, for notational convenience, we have multiplied each agent’s ex-post expected
utility conditional on σ by the constant piσ = piσ, yielding the expression
∑
s pisσ u
h[ωhs+
rs · yhσ] for the “agent-type” (h, σ). In program (P), both the informativeness of the
signal, as described by pi, and the allocation of assets, are chosen to maximize the
ex-post expected utility of agent-type (h1, σ1),
11 subject to the constraint that the
ex-post utility levels of all other agent-types are not lower than at the competitive
equilibrium (Φ1 ≥ 0), the resource feasibility constraints (Φ2 = 0), and the admissi-
bility constraints on probabilities (Φ3 = 0 and Φ4 = 0; note that these constraints
imply that
∑
s pisσ1 = piσ1). Let Φ := (Φ1, . . . ,Φ4).
The Lagrangian of the program (P) is
L(ξ; θ) =
∑
h,σ
µhσ
∑
s
pisσ
(
uh[ωhs + rs · yhσ]− uh
)
−
∑
σ
γ>σ
∑
h
yhσ −
∑
s
ηs
[∑
σ
pisσ − pis
]
−
∑
σ
νσ
[∑
s
pisσ − piσ
]
,
11For notational convenience, we have subtracted the constant piσ1u
h1 from the objective function
of the program (P).
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where
θ :=
{
µhσ, γσ, ηs, νσ
}
h∈H,s∈S,σ∈Σ ∈ RHΣ × RJΣ × RS × RΣ
is the vector of Lagrange multipliers, except for the elements µh1σ1 and νσ1 , which are
set equal to 1 and 0 respectively.
We now apply Theorem 3.3 in Simon (1986) to the program (P). In particular,
constraint qualification holds at ξ: the Jacobian of the constraints, DξΦ(ξ), has full
row rank by Lemma A.3. Lemma A.3 also establishes that DξΦ(ξ) is row-equivalent
to the matrix M defined as
0
∣∣∣∣ 0 ∣∣∣∣
(
. . .
{
0(H−1)×J diagh6=h1 [p
>]
}
. . .σ
———————————————
diagσ{. . . IJ . . .h}
)
——————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
diagσ 6=σ1

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h
———————–
1>S

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗
——————————————————————————————————–
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1 ∣∣ 0

(11)
A vector dξ = (dpi, dy) ∈ RSΣ × RJHΣ satisfying Mdξ = 0 is called a second order
test vector 12 for the program (P). Let M := {dξ : Mdξ = 0} be the subspace of
second order test vectors. Then, if ξ is a solution of (P), there exists a unique θ such
that
DξL(ξ; θ) = 0 (Pfoc)
(dξ)>[D2ξξL(ξ; θ)]dξ ≤ 0, ∀dξ ∈M (Psoc)
These are respectively the first and second order necessary conditions for Blackwell
efficiency of the equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p}. We analyze these in turn.
12This is standard terminology in the optimization literature. See, for example, Berkovitz (2002).
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Step 3: First order necessary conditions for Blackwell efficiency
Writing (Pfoc) more explicitly, we have:
∂L
∂pisσ
=
∑
h
µhσ
(
uh[ωhs + rs · yhσ]− uh
)
− ηs − νσ = 0 (12)
∂L
∂yhσ
= µhσ
∑
s
pisσu
h′[ωhs + rs · yhσ] rs − γσ = 0 (13)
It is straightforward to check that these equations are satisfied at θ = θ, where θ is
given by:
µhσ =
λ
h1
λ
h
, γσ = piσλ
h1
p, ηs =
∑
h
λ
h1
λ
h
(
uhs − uh
)
, νs = 0.
Since the value of the Lagrange multipliers θ is unique, we can use θ = θ in the
remainder of our analysis.
The reason why the FONCs are satisfied at ξ is as follows. The agents’ ex-ante
utility levels, evaluated at y = y, depend on pi only via the marginal distribution over
S, {pis}s∈S, which does not change as we vary pi in Π. Hence the first order effect of a
change in information on agents’ ex-ante utilities must be zero. A feasible change in
the portfolio allocation, on the other hand, may affect individual utilities but cannot
produce a Pareto improvement since, with pi = pi, the allocation y is constrained
efficient. This rules out the possibility of an ex-ante, and hence also ex-post, Pareto
improvement with respect to first order changes in pi and y.
Step 4: Second order necessary conditions for Blackwell efficiency
We now consider the second order necessary conditions (Psoc). We evaluate all
second derivatives of L at (ξ, θ), dropping any explicit reference to (ξ, θ) for notational
ease. From (12) we see that D2pipiL = 0. Therefore,
(dξ)>(D2ξξL)(dξ) = (dy)>(D2yyL)dy + 2(dpi)>(D2piyL)dy. (14)
Consider a second order test vector δξ = (δpi, δy) with the following properties:
δy = 0, (15)
δpisσ = 0, ∀s ≥ J + 1, ∀σ 6= σ1. (16)
It is apparent from an inspection of the equation system Mδξ = 0, together with
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(15) and (16), that δpi solves the equation system Lδpi = 0 where
L :=

0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h
———————–
1>S

——————————————————
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1
——————————————————
0
∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1{0 IS−J}

which is row-equivalent to
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
diagσ 6=σ1

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s≤J
...h
∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
—————————————
1>J
∣∣ ∗
—————————————
0
∣∣ IS−J

————————————————————————
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1

(17)
Given the dimensionality condition J > H + 1 imposed in the statement of the
Theorem, the upper right block of (17) has full row rank by Lemma A.1. Hence, the
set of second order test vectors δξ that satisfy (15)–(16) is a subspace of M′ ⊂ M
of dimension [J − (H + 1)](Σ− 1).
Now, if dξ ∈ M and δξ ∈ M′, then (dξ + xδξ) ∈ M, for all x ∈ R. For second
order test vectors of this form, (Psoc) reduces to (using (14)):
(dy)>(D2yyL)dy+ 2(dpi+xδpi)>(D2piyL)dy ≤ 0, ∀dξ ∈M, δξ ∈M′, x ∈ R. (18)
This condition is satisfied only if
v(dξ, δξ) := (δpi)>(D2piyL) dy = 0, ∀dξ ∈M, δξ ∈M′.
If not, x can be chosen so that the inequality in (18) is violated. The matrix D2piyL
is easily calculated from (13), giving us the following condition:
v(dξ, δξ) = λ
h1 ·
∑
h,s,σ
1
λ
h
δpisσ u
h
s
′
rs · dyhσ = 0, ∀dξ ∈M, δξ ∈M′. (C)
We have shown that (Psoc) requires that condition (C) holds. Therefore (C) is a
necessary condition for Blackwell efficiency of the equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p}.
Step 5: Analysis of the necessary condition (C)
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Condition (C) implies that Ddξv lies in the row span of M . From Lemma A.3, all
the diagonal blocks of M have full row rank. Since Ddpiv = 0, Ddyv must then be
in the row span of the top right block of M , i.e. there must be scalars ah ∈ R, with
ah1 = 0, and vectors bσ ∈ RJ such that
1
λ
h
∑
s
δpisσu
h
s
′
rs = bσ + a
hp, ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ
so that ∑
s
δpisσ
[
uhs
′
λ
h
− u
h1
s
′
λ
h1
]
rs = a
hp, ∀h ∈ H, σ ∈ Σ.
Since the term on the right hand side does not depend on σ we have
∑
s≤J
(δpisσ2 − δpisσ3)
[
uhs
′
λ
h
− u
h1
s
′
λ
h1
]
rs = 0, ∀h ∈ H, (19)
where we have used (16) to truncate the summation beyond the first J terms.
The vectors {rs}s≤J are linearly independent due to the general position of R
(Assumption 2). Furthermore, the term in square brackets is always nonzero, by
Lemma A.2. Therefore, δpisσ2 = δpisσ3 , for the first J states. It suffices to consider
the single restriction that applies for the J ’th state, namely
δpisJσ2 = δpisJσ3 . (20)
By the above argument, condition (C) implies that (20) is satisfied for every
second order test vector δpi ∈ M′. Adding this restriction to the equation system
Lδpi = 0 (see (17)), we get the augmented system Lˆδpi = 0, where
Lˆ :=
(
0
∣∣ Wˆ
—————————
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1
)
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and Wˆ is given by

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s≤J−1
...h
∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
———————————————–
1>J−1
∣∣ ∗ ∣∣ ∗
———————————————–
0
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ IS−J
———————————————–
0
∣∣ 1 ∣∣ 0

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗
——————————————————————————————————————
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
diagσ/∈{σ1,σ2}

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s≤J
...h
∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
————————————
1>J
∣∣ ∗
————————————
0
∣∣ IS−J


From Lemma A.1, and the dimensionality restriction J−1 ≥ H+1, it follows that Wˆ
has full row rank, and therefore so does Lˆ. Thus (20) is an independent restriction
on δpi in addition to the restriction Lδpi = 0, implying that there exists a vector
δξ∗ in M′ which does not satisfy (20). But then δξ∗ does not satisfy condition (C)
either. Therefore, the equilibrium {{yh}h∈H , p} cannot be Blackwell efficient. 2
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A Appendix
Consider the system of equations (8)–(10) which any competitive equilibrium must
satisfy. We denote the endogenous variables of this equation system by
ζ := [{yh, λh}h∈H , pˆ] ∈ RJH × RH × RJ−1
where pˆ is the vector obtained from p by deleting the last element. It is convenient to
write the first set of these equations, given by (8), as f(ζ;ω) = 0, and the remaining
equations, given by (9)–(10), as g(ζ;ω) = 0. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ζ is an
equilibrium if and only if
F (ζ;ω) :=
(
f(ζ;ω)
g(ζ;ω)
)
= 0.
This system has (J +1)H+(J−1) equations, equal to the number of unknowns #ζ.
The Jacobian of the equilibrium system can be written as follows:
Dζ,ωF =
(
Dζf Dωf
Dζg 0
)
,
with
Dωf = diagh{. . . pis uh′′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs . . .s}
and
Dζg =
(
diagh[p
>]
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ [. . . yˆh . . .h]>
——————————————–
. . . Iˆ> . . .h
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0
)
,
where Iˆ is the (J × (J − 1)) matrix defined by
Iˆ :=
(
IJ−1
———
0
)
.
By a standard argument, at any zero of F , both Dωf and Dζg have full row rank,
and hence so does Dζ;ωF .
Lemma A.1 Suppose S > J +H. Let
W :=

...
. . .
(
uh[ωhs + rs · yh]−
∑
s∈S pisu
h[ωhs + rs · yh]
)
. . .s≤H+1
...h

.
Then, for a generic subset of economies, at an equilibrium allocation {yh}h∈H , the
(square) matrix (
W
———
1>H+1
)
has full rank.
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Proof :
For ψ ∈ RH+1 we will show that, generically, there is no solution to
Ψ(ζ, ψ;ω) :=

F (ζ;ω)
W (ζ;ω)ψ
ψ · 1H+1
ψ · ψ − 1
 = 0.
The Jacobian, Dζ,ψ,ωΨ, is row-equivalent to
∗
∣∣∣ ∗ ∣∣∣ Dω ( fWψ
)
———————————————
0
∣∣∣ 1>H+1
2ψ>
∣∣∣ 0
———————————————
Dζ g
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

.
(21)
We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank at any zero of Ψ. As we have seen
already, Dζ g has full row rank. Also, ψ is orthogonal to 1H+1 and nonzero (since
ψ · ψ = 1). Hence, due to the triangular structure of (21), it suffices to show that
the upper right block, given by
Dω
(
f
Wψ
)
=
 diagh{. . . pis uh′′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs . . .s}——————————————————————————
diagh
{(
. . . ψs(1− pis)uh′[ωhs + rs · yh] . . .s≤H+1
) (
0 . . . 0
)} 
,
has full row rank. The above matrix is row-equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix,
with blocks indexed by h. The h’th block is:
 . . . pis uh′′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs . . .s≤H+1 ∣∣ . . . pis uh′′[ωhs + rs · yh] rs . . .s>H+1—————————————————————————————————–
. . . ψs(1− pis)uh′[ωhs + rs · yh] . . .s≤H+1
∣∣∣ 0

(22)
This matrix is triangular as well. Its upper right block has full row rank since it has
at least J columns and, by Assumption 2, R is in general position. The lower left
block is a single row which is nonzero.
We have shown that the Jacobian Dζ,ψ,ωΨ has full row rank. Thus Ψ(ζ, ψ;ω)
is transverse to 0. By the transversality theorem, there is an open, dense subset of
endowments such that, for each ω in this set, Ψω(ζ, ψ) is transverse to zero.
13 But
this is an overdetermined system of equations (with one extra equation relative to
the number of unknowns). Hence, Ψ−1ω (0) = ∅ and this establishes the result. 2
13Openness follows from a standard argument; see, for example, Citanna et al. (1998).
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Lemma A.2 Suppose S > J . Then, for a generic subset of economies, at an equi-
librium {{yh, λh}h∈H , p}, we have
uhˆ
′
[ωhˆs + rs · yhˆ]
λhˆ
6= u
hˇ′[ωhˇs + rs · yhˇ]
λhˇ
,
for any pair of agents hˆ and hˇ, for all s ∈ S.
Proof :
We will prove the result for the first two agents, h1 and h2, and the first state s1.
The same argument applies to any other pair of agents and any other state. Let
q(ζ;ω) :=
uh1
′
[ωh1s1 + rs1 · yh1 ]
λh1
− u
h2′[ωh2s1 + rs1 · yh2 ]
λh2
.
We will show that, generically, there is no solution to
Q(ζ;ω) :=
(
q(ζ;ω)
F (ζ;ω)
)
= 0.
The Jacobian of Q is
Dζ,ωQ =
 Dζq
∣∣ Dωq
Dζf
∣∣ Dωf
——————
Dζ g
∣∣ 0
 ,
where the top right block is given by

 uh1′′[ωh1s1 +rs1 ·yh1 ]λh1 ∣∣ 0—————————————————————————
pis1u
h1′′[ωh1s1 + rs1 · yh1 ]rs1
∣∣ . . . pisuh1′′[ωh1s + rs · yh1 ]rs . . .s 6=s1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
——————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣diagh6=h1{. . . pisuh′′[ωhs + rs · yh]rs . . .s}

(23)
By Assumption 2, and the dimensionality condition S > J , it follows that the matrix
[. . . rs . . .s 6=s1 ] has rank J . Hence the top left block of (23) has full row rank. The
bottom right block of (23) clearly has full row rank. This establishes full row rank
of the whole matrix (23). Furthermore, as we noted earlier, Dζ g always has full row
rank, so the Jacobian Dζ,ωQ has full row rank as well. Thus Q(ζ;ω) is transverse to
0. By the transversality theorem, there is an open, dense subset of endowments such
that, for each ω in this set, Qω(ζ) is transverse to zero. Hence, Q−1ω (0) = ∅ and this
establishes the result. 2
For the next lemma, we consider an economy in the generic set Ωˆ, and focus on an
equilibrium of this economy, {{yh, λh}h∈H , p}. Recall that DξΦ(ξ) is the Jacobian of
the constraints of program (P) evaluated at ξ = (pi, y).
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Lemma A.3 Suppose S > J + H. Then DξΦ(ξ) has full row rank. Moreover,
DξΦ(ξ) is row-equivalent to M (where M is defined by (11)) and all the diagonal
blocks of M have full row rank.
Proof :
The Jacobian DξΦ(ξ) is given by

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h6=h1
∣∣∣∣∣ 0
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 diagh6=h1 [piσ1λhp>]
∣∣∣∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣∣∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h
 ∣∣∣∣∣ 0
∣∣∣∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1,h[piσλhp>]
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ {. . . IJ . . .h} ∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1{. . . IJ . . .h}——————————————————————————————————————————————–
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1 ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1(1>S ) ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

where we have used (8) to evaluate the expressions in the (1,3) and (2,4) blocks.
This matrix is row equivalent to

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h6=h1
∣∣∣∣∣
...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s,σ 6=σ1
...h6=h1
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 diagh6=h1 [piσ1λhp>]
∣∣∣∣∣ . . .{0 diagh6=h1 [piσλhp>]} . . .σ 6=σ1
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣∣∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1

...
. . . (uhs − uh) . . .s
...h
∣∣∣∣∣ 0
∣∣∣∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1,h[piσλhp>]
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ {. . . IJ . . .h} ∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1{. . . IJ . . .h}——————————————————————————————————————————————–
IS
∣∣ . . . IS . . .σ 6=σ1 ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
0
∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1(1>S ) ∣∣ 0 ∣∣ 0

We perform further row operations on the above matrix. Using the second last row
block, we can set the first two elements of the top row block equal to zero. Then,
since piσ is invariant with respect to σ, we can eliminate from the top row block the
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terms piσλ
h
, for all h and σ. It follows that DξΦ(ξ) is row-equivalent to the matrix
M defined by (11).
The matrix M is lower triangular. The bottom left block of M clearly has full
row rank. The middle block has full row rank by Lemma A.1.14 The top right block
can be written as
(
0
∣∣ diagh6=h1 [p>]—————————
IJ
∣∣ . . . IJ . . .h6=h1
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ∗
——————————————————————
0
∣∣ diagσ 6=σ1{. . . IJ . . .h}

which also has full row rank. Hence M has full row rank, and consequently so does
DξΦ(ξ). 2
14The dimensionality condition S > J +H is needed in order to invoke Lemma A.1. We do not
use Lemma A.2 for this result.
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